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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Attribution theory, broadly conceived, has evolved over 
the years from the theoretical writings of Fritz Heider (1946, 
1958). Heider's work was primarily concerned with how an out­
side observer perceives the causes of another person's behav­
ior; that is, how does an individual come to know and compre­
hend the dispositions of other people? Heider's work was 
largely theoretical, but in recent years there has been re­
newed interest, both theoretical and empirical, in Heider's 
analysis. This new interest has come to be called "attribu­
tion theory" (Kelley, 196 7). Attribution theory is concerned 
with a person's appraisal of the causality relationships in 
various situations and the part this appraisal plays in subse­
quent behavior (Kelley, 1967, 197 3).
Heider's basic concern of how an outside observer per­
ceives the causes of another's behavior has been recently ex­
tended to the question of "how does a person come to know and 
understand himself?" Traditionally, the question of self- 
knowledge has been in the realm of philosophy and has been 
approached phenomenologically rather than empirically. Re­
cently this question has been addressed by Bern (1965, 1967,
1
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1972) within a theoretical structure he calls self-perception 
theory, which is, for the most part, synonymous with attribu­
tion theory (Kelley, 1973). Bern postulated that a person comes 
to understand himself in much the same way that a person learns 
of the attitudes, beliefs and dispositions of other people; 
that is, we learn of our own attitudes and dispositions, at 
least in part, from self-observation and from these observa­
tions we infer what we are like.
Bern (1965, 1972) presented two basic postulates that form 
the heart of his self-perception theory: individuals infer !
their beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, in some degree, 
from their behavior and from the situation in which their be­
havior occurs and, secondly, . . t o  the extent that in­
ternal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the in­
dividual is functionally in the same position as an outside 
observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those 
same external cues to infer the individual's inner states 
(1972, p. 2)." Bern maintained, then, that we observe our be­
havior towards some entity and from watching our behavior we
infer what our attitudes and beliefs must be towards that en­
tity .
Bern's theoretical formulations rest firmly upon the func­
tional verbal analysis of the so called "radical behaviorists" 
(Bern, 1965; Skinner, 1953, 1957) . This functional approach 
attempts to specify the discriminative stimuli that control a 
person's self-descriptive statements. Following Skinner (1957),
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Bern maintained that a functional verbal analysis is central 
to any conceptualization of personal epistomology (Bern, 1965). 
In fact, Bern felt that "It was Skinner's analysis which in­
spired 'self-perception theory' . . . (1972, p. 2)."
Skinner's (1957) analysis of verbal behavior essentially 
concluded that an individual's training to respond differen­
tially to internal states must necessarily be a product of 
social interaction. Verbal statements of self-description 
must be originally learned and based upon public stimuli.
Bern (1965) argued that one of the implications of Skinner's 
work is " . . . that many of the self-descriptive statements 
that appear to be exclusively under the discriminative control 
of private stimulation may, in fact, remain under the control 
of the same public events which members of the community them­
selves must use in 'inferring' the individual's inner states 
(1965, p. 199)." Bern, therefore, regarded the individual as 
an observer of his own behavior as well as the controlling 
variables involved in his behavior and it is, at least in 
part, from these observations that a person comes to "know" 
his attitudes, beliefs and dispositions.
Empirical support for self-perception theory comes from 
a number of experimental sources. Bern (1965, 1967, 1972) has 
reviewed the studies corroborating cognitive dissonance theory 
and has been able to account for the major findings within 
his self-perception model.
4
Cognitive Dissonance
Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance postu­
lates that if an individual holds two cognitions that are in­
consistent with one another, he will experience the pressure 
of an aversive state called cognitive dissonance. The organism 
will seek to reduce this aversive drive state either by chang­
ing his attitudes, beliefs or his behavior. Dissonance theory, 
then, accounts for observed differences between stimulus con­
ditions and responses by postulating ah internal hypothetical 
drive state. Bern's alternative explanation " . . .  eschews 
any reference to hypothetical internal processes and seeks, 
rather, to account for observed functional relations between 
stimuli and responses in terms of the individual's past train­
ing history (Bern, 1967, p. 184)." Bern's reinterpretation of 
dissonance theory is from an information-processing standpoint 
where, "The dependent variable is viewed simply as a self­
attribution based on the available evidence, which includes 
the overt behavior of the communication and the apparent con­
trolling variables of the behavior (Bern, 1972, p. 17)."
A widely investigated paradigm of cognitive dissonance 
theory is known as the forced compliance or insufficient jus­
tification studies. In the typical forced compliance study 
(Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) subjects are induced to perform 
some behavior under circumstances that do not justify the be­
havior. Furthermore, the behavior engaged in would imply the
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subject's endorsement of some attitude or belief counter to 
his own. For example, in a now classic study, Festinger and 
Carlsmith (1959) asked subjects to tell a fellow subject that 
a boring, repetitive task was enjoyable and interesting. For 
doing this, subjects were paid either $1 or $20. A predic­
tion in line with dissonance theory would be that the subjects 
paid $1 would find the contingencies insufficient to justify 
their behavior and would, therefore, seek to alter their atti­
tudes about how interesting the task was. Subjects in the $20 
condition would find justification enough and would not alter 
their attitudes about how enjoyable and interesting the task 
was. Results of the Festinger and Carlsmith study and others 
using the forced compliance paradigm (e.g., Brehm and Cohen, 
196 2) supported these predictions. That is, in terms of 
cognitive dissonance theory, subjects in the $1 condition, 
not having been paid well enough to excuse lying, would have 
to eliminate the dissonance created by the lie by changing 
their attitude to fit the statement.
In terms of self-perception theory the subject in the 
Festinger and Carlsmith study is an observer of his own be­
havior and he implicitly asks himself, "What must my attitude 
be if I behave in such a fashion?" The subject who receives 
the $20 inducement sees that his behavior is adequately ac­
counted for by the large inducement; that is, "I am doing this 
because I am being paid $20." The $1 subject cannot regard
6
the inducement as adequate justification for his behavior.
Asking the question of "what must my attitude be?", he infers 
that his behavior must reflect his actual attitude and, there­
fore, evaluates the task as enjoyable. Thus, self-perception 
theory is able to arrive at the same conclusions without pos­
tulating an internal motivational state (Bern, 1965).
Bern, in three extensive articles (1965, 1967, 1972), has 
reviewed the literature of cognitive dissonance and has argued 
that the dissonance results are " . . . consistent with the 
present (self-perception) analysis (Bern, 1965, p. 209)." Pre­
dictably, the re-evaluation of such a widely investigated theory 
has generated a controversy of arguments, counter arguments and 
the hope of a "crucial" experiment that would unequivocally dif­
ferentiate the two positions. There have been a number of 
"crucial" experiments (e.g., Bern and McConnell, 1970) but the 
results are equivocal. The two positions seem to be at an em­
pirical and logical impasse. Bern has stated " . . . it seems 
unlikely that a 'crucial' experiment for discriminating between 
(dissonance theory and self-perception theory) will ever be 
executed . . . (Bern and McConnell, 1970, p. 30)." The re- 
evaluation of cognitive dissonance theory, then, provides in­
direct support for Bern's notions but does not unequivocally 
support either theory. Importantly, self-perception theory is 
a more parsimonious explanation in that it does not postulate 
an internal drive state.
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Cognition and Emotional States
Ancillary support for self-perception is found in the 
work of Schachter and his colleagues (Schachter, 1964) on 
emotional states. Although these studies were not specifi­
cally designed to provide empirical data for Bern's self­
perception theory, they can be profitably viewed as support 
for his basic assumptions.
In a now classic series of studies, Schachter and his 
colleagues demonstrated that emotional states are not deter­
mined by physiological responses alone, but involve cognitive 
appraisal and the evaluation of the external stimulus environ­
ment. Schachter (1964) proposed three basic propositions that 
followed from his fundamental supposition that " . . .  emo­
tional states are a function of the interaction of . . . cog­
nitive factors with a state of physiological arousal (1964, 
p. 53)." First, given a state of physiological arousal for 
which an individual has no immediate explanation available, he 
will "label" this state and describe his feelings in terms of 
the cognitions available to him; secondly, if an individual 
has a completely appropriate explanation for a physiological 
state he will not look to external cues to evaluate it; and, 
thirdly, that an individual will "label" his feelings as emo­
tions only to the extent that he experiences an aroused state 
(Schachter, 1964).
Schachter and Singer (1962) designed an experiment to 
test the above assumptions. Subjects were led to believe that
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they were involved in a study of the effects of vitamin com­
pounds on vision. They agreed to receive an injection of a 
vitamin called "Suproxin." Depending upon the condition sub­
jects actually received either epinephrine (adrenaline) which 
has the effect of increasing blood pressure, heart rate, res­
piration rate and muscle and cerebral blood flow, or they re­
ceived an injection of a placebo (saline solution).
Subjects were divided into four groups and presented with 
various explanations of the effects of the drug "Suproxin."
The first group, Epinephrine Informed, was told that Suproxin 
side-effects were increased heart rate, shaking of the hands, 
and possibly their face might become warm and flushed; essen­
tially, the effects of an injection of epinephrine. The second 
group, Epinephrine Ignorant, was not told of any side effects. 
The third group, Epinephrine Misinformed, was told symptoms 
which are not consequences of an injection of epinephrine and 
thus provided the subjects with an inappropriate explanation 
of their feelings. Subjects in the above three conditions 
were all injected with the drug epinephrine. In a fourth group, 
subjects were injected with a placebo (saline solution) and 
were given the instructions as the Epinephrine Ignorant group.
The next step was the manipulation of an emotional-inducing 
cognition. The two states were Euphoria and Anger; two very 
different emotional states. In the Euphoria condition, a stooge 
(an experimenter confidant) introduced himself, made a few
9
introductory comments, and then began a sequence of whimsi­
cal activities (e.g., throwing paper as a game of basket­
ball, hoola hooping, etc.). Subjects were gathered in the 
room to wait for the drug to take effect. In the Anger con­
dition/ during the filling out of a questionnaire the stooge 
made a series of standardized comments, starting innocently, 
then becoming increasingly querrulus and ended in rage, rip­
ping up his questionnaire and stomping out of the room.
Through the above manipulation, Schachter and Singer 
were able to demonstrate that when subjects were not provided 
with an appropriate explanation for their arousal (Drug Ig­
norant group), they would erroneously attribute it to an ex­
ternal source. Furthermore, the same emotional state (epine­
phrine produced), could lead to various emotional labels as 
disparate as euphoria and anger. This study, then, demonstrated 
that one could manipulate an individual's self-attributions 
concerning his emotional state by manipulating external stimu­
lus cues.
It has been known for some time that pain perception is 
only partially a function of the pain producing stimulus (Bar­
ber, 1959; Melzack, 1961). Certainly the pain producing 
stimulus itself provides information for an individual's judg­
ment of pain. Attribution theorists have examined the extent 
to which the attribution process contributes to the judgment 
of pain.
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Nisbett and Schachter (1966), extending the earlier 
findings on emotional arousal, examined whether subjects 
could misattribute shock produced arousal to an external 
source. Subjects were given a placebo prior to taking a 
series of increasing electric shocks. They were asked to 
report when the shocks became painful and when they became 
too painful to tolerate. One group of subjects was told 
that the effects of the pill would be general autonomic 
arousal while another group was told that symptoms would 
not be those generally associated with fear arousal. They 
hypothesized, and found, that subjects who assumed that their 
arousal was produced by the drug would tolerate a greater in­
tensity of shock than subjects who attributed their arousal to 
the shock alone.. In sum, they demonstrated that subjects 
could be led to attribute stimulus-produced arousal to an 
external source.
The general finding that subjects can misattribute their 
emotional arousal to an emotionally irrelevant source has been 
demonstrated in a number of research reports (Dienstbier and 
Munter, 1971; Beaman, Diener, Tefft, and Fraser, 19 72). Zim- 
bardo, Cohen, Weisenberg, Dworkin, and Firestone (1966) found 
that subjects who were forced to receive experimental electric 
shock reported the same intensity of electrical shock as more 
painful and were also more physiologically responsive (GSR) 
than subjects who volunteered to participate.
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In a study similar to the misattribution manipulation 
of Nisbett and Schachter (1966), Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo 
(1969.) attempted to have subjects misattribute arousal accom­
panying the fear of anticipated electric shock to noise heard 
over a set of headphones. Subjects were given the choice of 
working on either of two insplvable puzzles while listening 
to the noise. Subjects were told that solving one puzzle 
would gain them money, solving the other would allow them to 
avoid a threatened shock. Half of the subjects were told that 
the noise had side effects that correspond to fear arousal 
(e.g., rapid breathing, viseral upset, etc.), and half were 
told side effects that do not correspond to fear arousal 
(e.g., ringing in the ears, headache, etc.). The dependent 
variable was the amount of time spent on the insolvable puz­
zles. The amount of time a subject would spend working on 
the shock puzzle, in contrast to the reward puzzle, could be 
used as an indicator of the subject's fear of shock. Subjects 
that were given the opportunity to attribute their arousal 
symptoms to the noise spent significantly more time working 
on the reward puzzle than did subjects who could only attri­
bute their arousal to the fear of shock.
Ross, et al. titled their article "Toward an attribu­
tion therapy," and argued that their results had strong impli­
cations for the therapeutic situation. Following this line of 
reasoning, Storms and Nisbett (1970) extended the findings to
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the experimental treatment of insomnia. Subjects were asked 
to take a pill before bedtime. Subjects were led to believe 
that the pill, actually a placebo, would, for one group of 
subjects, increase arousal and alertness (generally symptoms 
that subjects had previously reported as characteristic of a 
night of insomnia). The second group was told that the pill 
would decrease arousal and alertness. Storms and Nisbett hy­
pothesized that the subjects who were told that the pill would 
produce alertness would attribute their alertness to the drug 
rather than their emotionality, and therefore, fall asleep more 
quickly than other groups. It was found that subjects who were 
in the drug arousal group did report getting to sleep faster 
on the nights when they took the pill. In sum, the findings 
suggested that individuals are able to reattribute arousal re­
actions to external or circumstantial causes.
In an insightful extension of attribution theory, Beaman, 
Diener, Tefft, and Fraser (1972)' investigated the misattribu- 
tion process in the treatment of test anxiety. In a paradigm 
similar to Storms and Nisbett (1970) , test anxious subjects 
were led to believe that a placebo had the side effects of 
general emotional arousal (e.g., tremors, palpitations, rapid 
breathing, etc.). Subjects were then placed in a testing sit­
uation in which they could misattribute their emotional arousal 
to an irrelevant source: the pill. Subjects in this condition
significantly decreased their scores on the Test Anxiety Scale
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assessed about one week later. That is, after being given 
the opportunity to reattribute their emotional arousal to a 
nonemotional source, subjects subsequently reported a lowered 
perception of their level of test anxiety.
In a study specifically designed to examine self-percep­
tion theory, Bandler, Madaras and Bern (1968) investigated 
whether an individual's perception of a stimulus as uncomfor­
table or painful is partially an inference from his observa­
tion of his response to that stimulus. Male college students 
were used in three experimental conditions: escape condition,
no escape condition, and reaction time condition. Prior to 
the experimental conditions, subjects rated varying intensities 
of shock on a one to seven scale. After the series of shocks, 
each subject was told that he would receive a shock and .5 
second later a colored light would come on signaling one of 
the three experimental conditions. In the escape condition 
(red light) the subject was told that he could escape the shock 
by pressing a button. In the no escape condition (green light) 
the subject was told that he should not turn off the shock un­
less the shock was too uncomfortable. In the reaction time 
condition (yellow light) the subject was asked to press the 
button so that the experimenter could measure his reaction 
time. Pressing the button in this condition might or might 
not terminate the shock. Also, a demand characteristics con­
trol group condition w.as run to rule out experimental bias
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artifacts. Following each shock the subjects were asked to 
rate the shock on a rating scale. vResults indicated that 
rated discomfort in the escape condition was significantly 
higher than in the no escape condition. Results further re­
vealed that the "button press must be seen as a self-determined 
'escape response' if it is to serve as the basis of inference 
for the individuals' discomfort judgment (Bandler, et al., 
1968}." That is, the reaction time condition was significantly 
lower than the escape condition and not significantly different 
from the no escape condition. In sum, an individual's percep­
tion of a stimulus as uncomfortable or painful is, to some ex­
tent, an inference from his.own observation of his response to 
that stimulus.
The previous study lent strong support to Bern's postu­
late that people infer their attitudes from the observation 
of their own behavior. Furthermore, the possibility that sub­
jects in the escape condition might be more physiologically 
aroused than in the other conditions received analysis through 
the use of GSR. Results indicated that there was no signi- 
cant difference between the experimental conditions as measured 
by GSR. The authors concluded that "the obtained rating dif­
ferences can be attributed to subjects' inferences from ob­
servation of their own response to the electrical shock (Band­
ler, et al., 1968)."
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Autonomic Activity as a Source of Cognitive Information
Within Schachter's (1964) cognitive-physiological theory 
of emotion, physiological activity acts as a cue indicating the 
intensity of the emotion and the cognitive evaluation of ex­
ternal discriminative stimuli determines the quality of the 
emotion. Valins (1966) examined the role of physiological 
activity as a source of cognitive information. Valins at­
tempted to assertain whether an individual's self-attribution 
could be influenced by autonomic feedback. The work of Valins 
and his colleagues along these lines (e.g., Valins and Ray, 
1967) clearly supported Bern's self-perception theory.
Valins (1966) led subjects to believe that they were 
hearing their own heart rate feedback while they viewed ten 
slides of semi-nude females. The heartbeats the subjects 
heard were pre-programmed so as to appear that their heart 
rate increased on viewing some of the slides. Subjects rated 
a slide as more attractive when it was associated with a heart 
rate change. They also found that, when the subjects were 
given the chance to take home some of the slides, the ones 
that were associated with a heart rate change were more fre­
quently chosen.
In a follow-up study, Valins (1972) examined the effect 
of debriefing on subjects' rating of the nudes. After telling 
the subjects that the~ heart rate feedback was bogus, he found 
that their ratings of attractiveness remained substantially
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unchanged. Valins (1972) explained this interesting result 
from a hypothesis generating standpoint. When subjects heard 
the altered heart rate, they generated a hypothesis that "the 
girl must be unusually attractive. "Closer inspection simply 
showed them what their 'subconscious' knew all the time 
(Valins, 1972, p. 407)." Then a searching process would 
begin, seeking confirmation of the hypothesis. In terms of 
self-perception theory, this hypothesis-confirmation notion 
could add new insight into the process by which one forms at­
titudes and dispositions and will undoubtedly be of research 
interest in the future.
Valins and Ray (1966) extended the findings of Valins 
(1966) into the area of psychotherapy, specifically systematic 
desensitization. In systematic desensitization a person is 
gradually exposed to a feared object when he is assumed to be 
in a state of muscle relaxation. Following their work on mis- 
attribution of autonomic feedback they hypothesized that sys­
tematic desensitization is as effective when individuals be­
lieve they are relaxed as when they actually are relaxed.
Snake phobic subjects were told that the study involved phy­
siological reactions to frightening stimuli (snakes and shocks). 
As in other studies, bogus heart rate feedback was used. Sub­
jects viewed slides, half had a picture of a snake and half 
were printed with the work "SHOCK" —  the latter slides were 
accompanied by a mild shock. Only on the SHOCK slides did
17
the programmed heart rate increase. The authors assumed 
" . . . that subjects might infer from this arousal infor­
mation that, while they were afraid of shocks, they were not 
afraid of snakes (Nisbett and Valins, 1972, p. 73)." The de­
pendent variable was how close the subjects could approach a 
snake. Subjects who believed the heart feedback was their 
own were able to approach the snake closer than control sub­
jects .
Results in the area of autonomic feedback seems to lend 
support to the notion that we infer our feelings about stimuli 
from information about the degree and source of autonomic 
arousal even when it is false. There is evidence (Valins and 
Nisbett, 1972) to suggest, however, that such inferences are 
not necessarily passive or immediately accepted. Instead,
" . . . subjects may actively attempt to validate their in­
ferences before encoding them as truth (Nisbett and Valins, 
1972, p. 74)."
Mands and Tacts
Bern, as noted earlier, based a large part o.f his self­
perception model upon the functional approach of the "radical 
behaviorist," mainly Skinner's (1959) analysis of verbal be­
havior. Again, Bern attempted to specify the discriminative 
stimuli that control a person's self-descriptive statements. 
Following Skinner, Bern argued that a person may discriminate 
the verbalizations of others and himself as "mands" and 
"tacts."
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"A descriptive statement, a verbal response that is 
under the control of some portion of the environment, is 
classified as a 'tact' (Bern, 1965, p. 200).'' Tacts, then, 
are descriptive statements about the environment and the 
speaker receives generalized reinforcements for these state­
ments. Attitude and belief statements are often tacts, for 
example, "I am thirsty"; tacts can describe behavior, for 
example, "I am gregarious."
"Mands" are " . . .  verbal responses that are under the 
control of specific reinforcing contingencies . , . (Bern,
1965, p. 200)." A person who emits a mand (comMAND; deMAND) 
is requesting, asking for or demanding a specific reinforcer, 
and it is only this specific property that will serve to re­
inforce the response. "Please get me my coat," is a mand; 
mands need not be verbal, often gestures have mand character­
istics. Bern (1965) pointed out that mands are often disguised 
as tacts: " . . .  the television announcer who praises a pro­
duct he is selling; his verbal behavior is a mand for the 
salary he receives and may not at all be under the actual dis­
criminative control of the features of the product he appears
to be tacting (Bern, 1965, p. 201)."
y.
In summary, tacts can be seen as descriptive statements 
about a stimulus that are elicited by an individual's intrin­
sic feelings about a stimulus. Mands, on the other hand, are 
statements about a stimulus that are elicited by a person in
19
order to gain a particular reinforcement from the environment; 
statements under the control of circumstances other than the 
individual's intrinsic feelings about the stimulus.
Any particular verbal statement may have both mand and 
tact characteristics.. The television announcer, for example, 
might indeed find the product he is selling useful, and to 
that extent he is tacting as well as manding. The listener 
must often discriminate the mand-tact characteristic of a 
communication in order to infer a speaker's "true" beliefs • 
and attitudes. "A communicator is credible to the extent that 
his communication is discriminated as a set of tacts, his cre­
dibility is vitiated to the extent that he appears to be mand­
ing in the form of disguised tacts (Bern, 1965, p. 201)."
In a number of methodological approaches, Bern (1965,
1966) has attempted to empirically demonstrate the mand-tact 
characteristic of belief and attitude inferences. Within an 
experimental methodology called "interpersonal simulation,"
Bern (1965) replicated the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study 
mentioned earlier. It will be recalled that subjects paid $1 
or $20 for telling a stooge that a series of tasks were in­
teresting when in fact they were boring and uninteresting. 
Subjects in the $1 condition subsequently rated the task as 
more enjoyable. The subjects in this study were asked to 
listen to a tape recording of a person who had participated 
in an experiment involving two motor tasks. Subjects in the
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experimental group were told that the person on the recording 
had accepted an offer of either $1 or $20 to go into the 
waiting room and tell the next subject that the boring tasks 
were fun and enjoyable. Subjects listened to the tape re­
corded statements made about how enjoyable the tasks were.
Then they were asked to estimate the subjects' attitude to­
wards the tasks. Observers of the subjects estimated the 
person's attitude to be significantly more favorable than did 
observers of either the $20 group or the control group.
Bern reasoned that " . . .  when asked to reason the true 
attitude of the communicator, an outside observer would almost 
certainly judge the $20 communication to be a mand . . . (1965,
p. 202," and the $1 communication would more likely be judged 
a tact. Bern felt that the findings of this and other inter­
personal simulation studies (e.g., Bern, 1965) support self­
perception. That is, "If one places our hypothetical outside 
observer (and the observer in the above study) and the com­
municator in the same skin, the findings obtained by Festinger 
and Carlsmith are the result (Bern, 1965, p. 202)."
Lie Light Studies
In the interpersonal simulation studies the stimulus oper­
ations have had other functional properties. In the study re­
viewed, for example, money, due to an individual's past train­
ing history, has a number of function reinforcing properties.
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In an attempt to provide more direct support, Bern (1965, 1966) 
designed a methodology in which the stimulus operations would 
have no other functional properties than those imputed in the 
laboratory.
The first study utilizing this methodology was concerned 
with attitude change. In this study (1965) the experimental 
session was disguised as a tape-recording session to prepare 
experimental materials for a future experiment that would try 
to determine if individuals could, from voice recordings, de­
tect an incorrect statement. Subjects first filled out a 50- 
item questionnaire on personal information. Then each subject 
underwent a training procedure in which he answered questions 
about himself in the presence of a distinctively colored light. 
The questions came from the personal information questionnaire, 
and after each question was asked, a tape recorder was turned 
on, automatically illuminating one of two colored lights. The 
subject was instructed to answer truthfully whenever the light 
was amber. Whenever the light was green he was instructed to 
answer falsely and say it convincingly into the tape recorder. 
For half of the subjects the presentations of the lights were 
reversed, that is> the green light became the "truth" light 
and the amber light became the "lie" light.
The subject learned, in this way, that whenever he spoke 
in the presence of the amber light (truth light) he could be­
lieve himself and could not believe himself in the presence of
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the green light (lie light). After the training session, 
subjects were shown a series of cartoons which they had pre­
viously rated as neutral. For each cartoon, the subject was 
instructed to say that the cartoon was either "very funny" 
or "very unfunny" into the tape recorder. Sometimes the lie 
light was illuminated and sometimes the truth light was il­
luminated. After the subject had tape recorded a response, 
the light was turned off and he was asked to indicate his 
attitude towards the cartoon.
In line with self-perception theory, the subjects changed 
their attitudes about how funny the cartoons were when they 
made their statements in the presence of the truth light. In­
terestingly, an awareness questionnaire was administered and 
Bern reported(1965) that no subject was aware of any attitude 
change nor of the effects of the lights. "The cartoon study 
demonstrated that the self-attributions known as attitude 
statements could be brought under the control of an indivi­
dual's own verbal behavior and the accompanying stimulus con­
ditions in which that behavior occurs (Bern, 1972, p. 10)."
Using the same methodology, Bern (1966) attempted to ex­
tend the evidence for self-perception to a different kind of 
dependent variable: the recall of prior events. The same
procedure as above was used, but instead of cartoons subjects 
were given a list of 100 common nouns and an alphabetical list 
containing 50 of those nouns. Their task was to cross out
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each word on the master list that appeared on the alphabeti­
cal list. This was the behavior that, later, the subject
would be asked to recall.
After the preliminary training session described above, 
subjects were asked to make statements about the 100 nouns. 
Again, true statements were made in the presence of one col­
ored light and false statements were made in the presence of 
another colored light. After the subject had made a state­
ment, the recorder and light were turned off, and the subject
was asked to recall whether or not he had crossed out the word.
Again the results were in line with the self-perception 
hypothesis; subjects' false confession in the presence of the 
"lie" light had no effect on recall. In the presence of the 
truth light, false confessions did produce significant error 
in recall. Maslach (1971) replicated Bern's major finding 
that the truth light produced more errors of recall following 
the false confession.
Using essentially the same procedure as described above, 
Linder and Jones (1969) demonstrated that post-experimental 
attitudes could be affected by recording a counter-attitudinal 
statement in the presence of a light previously associated with 
correct statements. Importantly, Linder and Jones were only 
able to obtain this effect if the subjects were given the 
choice to read the counterattitudinal statement. That is, if 
the subjects were required to read the statement (opposed to
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being asked to read the statement) the attitude change was not 
found. This finding is congruent with the mand-tact distinc­
tion. If the subject was required to read the statement 
(manding), he discriminates it as more mand than tact (the 
light influence), and later statements will not be influenced.
Self-perception theory; then, has found both direct and 
indirect support from a number of experimental sources: the
re-evaluation of cognitive dissonance (Bern, 1965, 1967, 1972); 
the work of Schachter and his colleagues on emotional states 
(Schachter, 1964; Schachter and Singer, 1962); autonomic feed­
back and misattribution (Valins, 1966; Valins and Ray, 1967;
i
Beaman, Diener, Tefft, Fraser, 1972; Nisbett fand Valins, 1972). 
Direct support has come from Bern's own research (196 5, 1966,
1967; Bern and McConnell, 1970) and from extensions and replica­
tions of his methodology (Bandler, Madaras, Bern, 196 8; Linder 
and Jones, 1969). Bern's basic notion that we infer our atti­
tudes, beliefs and dispositions, at least in part, from self­
observations of our behavior and the situation in which it occurs 
has been widely supported.
CHAPTER II
RATIONALE OF PRESENT STUDY
Research in attribution theory has almost exclusively 
been concerned with attitudes and beliefs and how they are, 
at least in part, an inference drawn from self-observation. 
Beaman, et al. (1972) , however, have demonstrated that the 
misattribution process may have relatively long term effect 
upon the relatively stable personality variable of test an­
xiety. The present study attempted to extend the findings 
of self-perception theory into the area of personality dis­
positions .
A "trait" conceptualization of personality variables as 
being determined by predispositional states thatmanifest 
themselves stably, more or less independently of stimulus 
conditions, has been seriously questioned (Mischel, 196 8).
It was the purpose of the study to examine one of the possible 
stimulus conditions that can affect personality traits.
Anxiety is generally considered to be a relatively stable 
and enduring personality variable (e.g., White, 1956). This 
study attempted to produce a change in the anxiety level of 
high anxious subjects within Bern's lie-light paradigm. That 
is, subjects were asked to read a low anxious personality 
statement in a situation that has in the past been associated 
with true statements.
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Spielberger (1966) has differentiated between two types 
of anxiety: these two distinct anxiety factors have been
termed trait anxiety and state anxiety. State anxiety refers 
to a transitory emotional state or condition and fluctuates 
over time. Trait anxiety refers to a relatively stable in­
dividual difference in anxiety proneness. Spielberger'.s 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was used as a dependent measure 
in the present study along with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale.
It was hypothesized that (1) high anxious subjects who 
read low anxious statements in the presence of the truth 
light will subsequently decrease their scores on the Trait 
Anxiety Scale; (2) high anxious subjects who read high an­
xious statements in the presence of the lie light will sub­
sequently decrease scores on the Trait Anxiety Scale; (3) in 
both conditions subjects will also subsequently decrease 
scores on the State Anxiety Scale.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Summary of Procedures
The subjects were recruited from an introductory psy­
chology class at the University of Montana. All Ss had pre­
viously taken Spielberger1s State-Trait Anxiety Scale and the 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. The Ss represented the top 
25% of the distribution of scores on the Trait scale, defin­
ing them as high anxious individuals * The Ss were told that 
they were to help prepare experimental materials for a future 
experiment concerned with an individual's ability to detect 
lies and truths from voice material. The £s were first to 
fill out a 50-item personal information questionnaire (Lane 
and Bern, 1965; Appendix A). Using the items from this ques­
tionnaire, subjects were asked to tape record some of their 
answers correctly and some incorrectly. The Ss were trained 
to answer correctly in the presence of a distinctively 
colored light (truth light) and falsely in the presence of a 
differently colored light (lie light). Following this, Ss 
were asked to volunteer to tape record a personality descrip­
tion. For one group of £s the description was that of a "low 
anxious" person (Appendix B) and was read in the presence of
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the truth light. For the second group of Ss, the description 
was read in the presence of the lie light and described a 
"high anxious" individual (Appendix C). A third group read 
the low anxious statement in the presence of a neutral light, 
that is, a white light that has no association with true or 
false statements. And a fourth group read the "high anxious" 
statement in the presence of the neutral light. All Ss were 
run individually. When Ss finished reading the statement, they 
were told that the tape had ran out and were asked if they would 
read it one more time. This was done to increase the salience 
of the manipulation. Following this, Ss were thanked for parti­
cipating and asked if they would mind "going down the hall" and 
taking a short questionnaire from another experimenter. In the 
"other experiment" Ss re-took the State-Trait and the Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale. After completion of the scales, the Ss 
were asked to return and fill out further questionnaires (two- 
week follow-up on State-Trait and MAS). The State-Trait and 
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale were analyzed in a 3 x 4 split 
plot design.
Subjects
Subjects were students from an introductory psychology 
class at the University of Montana. The Ss were selected on 
the basis of their Trait score on a previously administered 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and represented the top 25% of 
the population. All Ss were run individually.
Procedure
Upon reporting, Ss were told that they were to "assist" 
in preparing experimental materials for a study on individuals'
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ability to detect truths and lies from recorded voice. The
Ss were asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning personal
information (Lane and Bern, 1965) that was used later in the
recording section. The questionnaire consisted of fifty items
and the instructions and sample question from this form are
reproduced below:
This information form will provide some of the materials 
you will be recording on tape for the voice-judgment ex­
periment. It should be filled out completely and accur­
ately. THIS INFORMATION WILL .REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL AND 
ANONYMOUS. YOUR NAME WILL NOT APPEAR ON THE TAPE OR ELSE­
WHERE IN THE EXPERIMENT.
( 1) First Name ____ ________________ _________________
(29) Do you believe in a Supreme Being? '
After obtaining the information, Ss were seated at a desk with
a partition separating E from S. Following Bern (196 5), the
following instructions were given to the Ss:
As I mentioned, you are going to be making a tape of your 
own voice to be used in some research we will be doing on 
an individual's ability to judge another person's voice.
In particular, we are going to be examining an individual's 
ability to judge whether the speaker on the tape is telling 
the truth or not. To do this, some of the things you will 
say on the tape will be true statements; others will be 
untrue. The procedure will be as follows: I will ask you
questions, one at a time, from the list of information you 
just filled out. After I ask you questions, I will start 
the tape recorder, and you should answer into the micro­
phone in front of you. Whenever I turn on the tape re­
corder, one of the two colored light bulbs1 in the lamp 
fixture will also go on automatically. If the red light 
goes on (red light goes on), you are to answer the question 
truthfully; if, however, the blue light turns on (blue light 
on; red light turned off), you should make up an untrue an­
swer and speak into the microphone as convincingly and as 
naturally as possible. My questions will not be recorded 
on the tape, so your answers must be complete statements, 
not just single word answers. For example, I will ask:
"What is your first name?" When the ceiling light goes
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on, you should answer, "My first name is such-and-such."
If the light is red, then you would, of course, give your 
real first name. If the light is blue, you would make up 
some other name. As you can see, we wanted this to be 
spontaneous, which is why you will not know until the 
tape actually starts whether you are going to give a true 
or an untrue statement; you have to be on your toes. The 
lighting circuitry is set to select the two colored lights 
automatically and in random sequence. I will be checking 
your responses on your information form; when you record 
in the appropriate way I will stop the tape, the colored 
light will go out, and we will proceed to the next ques­
tion. If you happen to make a mistake, or do not answer 
with a complete sentence we will repeat that item. Are 
there any questions? (pause) Okay, remember the red 
light means you are to give a true answer; the blue light, 
an untrue one.
The training procedure proceeded as described with half of the
questions requiring a true answer and half requiring a false
answer. The lights were reversed for half the Ss; that is,
blue light for true responses and red light for false responses.
At the end of the training session, E returned to the S's
room and continuedas follows:
We have now completed all the questions on the informa­
tion form. In the second part of the voice judgment ex­
periment, subjects will be asked to judge whether or not 
a personality profile is that of a female or that of a 
male. We have had past subjects write a personality 
description.of themselves, from, these descriptions we 
have grouped some male statements together to produce a 
male personality profile and we have grouped some female 
statements together to produce a female profile. Some 
of the male personality profiles will be read by females 
and some by males. Also, some of the male personality 
profiles will be read by females and some by males. We 
will ask subjects in the voice judgment experiment if 
the personality profile is that of a female or that of 
a male. The choice of which one you read is up to you, 
but we have had a lot of females (males) read male (female) 
statements and to even out our pool of statements it would 
be helpful if you read the female (male; sex same state­
ment) statement, but, of course, the choice is up to you. 
(pause) One of the lights will come on, its just connected
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to the tape recorder and it will be a signal for you to 
begin. (Neutral light conditions: the white light bulb
is also connected to the tape recorder and it will be a 
signal for you to begin.) I would like you to read the 
statement as convincingly and as naturally as possible. 
Okay? One of the lights will be on (white light bulb in 
neutral condition) when the tape recorder is on —  which­
ever one is next in the sequence programmed into the cir­
cuitry. You may begin when the light comes on.
When the S_ finished reading the statement, E popped the tape
out of the recorder and said the following:
Oh! I ran out of tape, would you mind reading the state­
ment one more time? Okay? I'll get another tape. (E 
gets a new tape.) Again, one of the lights will be a 
signal for you to begin. You may begin when the light 
comes on.
Ss were blocked along the dependent variable (score on 
Spielberger's Trait), in groups of four and then randomly 
assigned to four treatment conditions.
1. Truth light condition: In this condition Ss read
a "low anxious" statement in the presence of the 
truth light.
2. Lie light condition: Ss in this condition read a
"high anxious" statement in the presence of the 
light that had previously been used to elicit false 
statements.
3. Neutral light, low anxious condition: In this condi­
tion Ss read a low anxious statement in the presence
Of a white light that had not been previously asso­
ciated with either true or false statements.
4. Neutral light, high anxious condition: In this con­
dition Ss read high anxious statements in the presence
of a neutral light.
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In all four conditions, when the Ss finished reading the per­
sonality statement the E thanked the £ for participating and 
then stated the following:
Another graduate student is gathering data on some ques­
tionnaires and asked me if I would ask you to participate. 
He said it only takes twenty minutes or so and he will 
give you an hour credit for it. Would you like to do it? 
(pause) It's just down the hall (E leads S out and points 
out the room where the testing is to be done).
Dependent Variable
The scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Scale and the Tay­
lor Manifest Anxiety Scale were used as the dependent variable.
When subjects completed the above inventories they were 
asked to return in two weeks and an appointment time set. Af­
ter the two-week follow-up testing, subjects were given an ex­
planation of the deceptions employed, the necessity for them, 
and the theories that generated the experiment. The experi­
menter elicited a promise of secrecy and dismissed the Ss.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Due to a failure of three subjects to report for the 
initial experimental procedure, the blocking was slightly 
violated. The resulting mean Trait Anxiety score for the 
four groups was 49.92, and the four means ranged from 49.15 
to 51.38. The initial means and their movement across the 
testing sessions are shown in Figure 1. An analysis of vari­
ance (ANOVA) was conducted which indicated that there were no 
significant differences between the four groups initially 
(F <1). Therefore, the assigning procedure appeared effec­
tive and subsequent differences cannot be attributed to ini­
tial differences between the four groups. Similarly, an 
ANOVA on the State Anxiety Inventory and Manifest Anxiety 
scores yielded no significant differences indicating that ' 
randomization of these subject variables was effective.
Fourteen subjects were assigned to each of the four ex­
perimental conditions. However, due to the failure of two 
subjects to report for the two-week follow-up testing (one in 
each of two conditions) two subjects were randomly dropped 
from the two remaining conditions. Therefore the State-Trait 
analysis was conducted on 13 subjects in each of the four con­
ditions.
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Figure 1. Mean Trait Anxiety scores as a function of testing 
sessions. The confidence interval shown is two- 
tailed, a = .05, for group 4. Group 1 was a low- 
anxious statement in truth light condition; group 
2, high anxious, lie light; group 3, low-anxious, 
neutral light; group 4, high anxious, neutral 
light.
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A 4 x 3 split-plot factorial analysis (Kirk, 1968, p.
248) was performed on the mean Trait Anxiety scores. The 
summary of the analysis is shown in Table 1. A significant 
F ratio (F = 36.779, df = 9/96, p <.01) was obtained across 
the testing sessions (B). In that the subjects represented 
the top 25% of the distribution, this finding is most likely 
an artifact due to regression. The overall AB interaction 
analysis was not significant (F = 1.38, df = 6/96, n.s.) 
lending no support for the hypotheses that high anxious sub­
jects who read low anxious statements in the presence of the 
truth light and high anxious subjects who read high anxious 
statements in the presence of the lie light will subsequently 
decrease their scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory.
An overall significant F ratio is not a necessary condi­
tion to conduct a priori orthogonal comparisons (Kirk, 196 8, 
p. 73). Accordingly, orthogonal comparisons were performed 
between the relevant experimental and control conditions.
Their orthogonality and the results of the analyses are sum­
marized in Table 2. The hypothesis that high anxious subjects 
who read a low anxious statement in the presence of a truth 
light will subsequently decrease their score on the Trait 
Anxiety Inventory was supported since groups one (low anxious, 
truth light) and three (low anxious, neutral light) differed 
significantly at the post-manipulation testing session (t = 
3.28, df = 24, p <.01; comparison 1). The comparison of group 
one and three at the follow-up testing was also significant 
(t = 2.11, df = 24, p <.01) although the magnitude of differ­
ence did decrease during the two-week period between the
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OP SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS 
OF TRAIT INVENTORY
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 161.14 3 53.715 0.642
Subj. W. Groups 4015.85 48 83.663
Within Subjects
Repeated measures (B) 1111.27 2 555.635 36.779*
AB 125.75 6 20.959 1.387
B x Subj. W. Groups • 1450.31 96 15.107
Total 6864.33 155
* P <.01
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF ORTHOGONAL COMPARISONS OF 
TRAIT INVENTORY SCORES
Post-Manipulation 
Testing 2 . df t
Comparison 1
gp 1 
-1
gp 2 gp 3 
0 1
gp 4 
0 24 3.28*
Comparison 2 0 -1 0 1 24 .76
Comparison 3 -1
Follow-Up 
Testing 3
0 1 0 24 2,11*
Comparison 4 0 -1 0 1 24 .40
*p <.01
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post-manipulation testing sessions two and the follow-up 
testing. No significant results were found in the compari­
sons between groups two and four at the post-manipulation 
testing (t = .761, df = 24, n.s.) and the follow-up testing 
(t = .400, df_ = 24, n.s.). Therefore, the hypothesis that 
subjects who read a high anxious statement in the presence 
of a lie light would subsequently decrease their score on 
the Trait Anxiety^ Inventory was not supported.
Confounding the results to some degree was a difference 
between groups three (low anxious, neutral light) and four 
(high anxious, neutral light) at the post-manipulation test­
ing. A two-tailed confidence interval was computed with the 
use of the LSD procedure (Kirk, 1968, p. 76). The critical 
difference needed at the .05 level was 3.14 and the differ­
ence obtained between groups three and four at the post­
manipulation testing was 3.46, indicating that it is unlikely 
that the two means are representative of the same population 
(see Figure 1). The difference between groups three and 
four at the follow-up testing (difference = 1.23) did not 
exceed the critical difference.
A 4 x 3 split factorial analysis (Kirk, 1968, p. 248) was 
performed on the mean State Anxiety Inventory scores. The 
summary of this analysis is summarized in Table 3. Again, the 
repeated measures variable (B) yielded a significant F ratio 
(F = 5.14, df = 2/96, p <.05). In that all four groups de­
creased across the testing sessions, the major portion of the
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TABLE 3 '
SUMMARY OF SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS 
OF STATE INVENTORY
Source SS df MS F
Between Subjects
Experimental conditions (A) 555.12 3 185.04 1.26
Subj. W. Groups 7036.31 48 146.59
Within Subjects
Repeated measures (B) 486.50 2 243.25 5.14*
AB 281.29 6 46.88 .99
B x Subj. W. Groups 4541.54 96
Total 12900.76 155
* p <.01
40
variance was most likely accounted for by regression. The 
hypothesis that State Anxiety Inventory scores would decrease 
as a function of reading low anxious statements in the pre­
sence of a truth light and the reading of high anxious state­
ments in the presence of a lie light was not supported (F = .99, 
df = 6/96, n.s.). Appropriate a priori orthogonal comparisons 
also yielded non-significant differences.
Finally, a 4 x 3 split-plot factorial analysis (Kirk,
196 8, p. 24 8) was performed on the mean Manifest Anxiety Scale 
scores. In that not all subjects in the State-Trait analysis 
took the MAS and the failure of subjects to return for the two- 
week follow-up, subjects were randomly discarded to produce an 
equal sample of 11 per cell. The summary of this analysis is 
shown in Table 4. The hypotheses that MAS scores would decrease 
as a function of the reading of a low anxious statement in the 
presence of a truth light and the reading of a high anxious 
statement in the presence of a lie light were not supported 
(F =.310, df = 6/80, n.s.) .
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF SPLIT-PLOT FACTORIAL ANALYSIS OF 
MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE
Source SS df MS F
BetweenSubjects
Experimental conditions (A) 55.333 3 18.444 .592
Subj. W. Groups 1245.580 40 31.139
Within Subjects
Repeated Measures (B) 22.242 2 11.121 1.634
AB 12.666 6 2.111 .310
B x Subj. W. Groups 544.424 80
Total 1880.240 131
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The major findings of this study tend to support Bern's 
basic position that a person comes to understand himself, at 
least in part, through self-observation. Within Bern's model 
it could be postulated that subjects who read low anxious, 
counter-dispositional statements found internal validating 
cues weak and ambiguous. In accord with self-perception 
theory, subjects should seek cues to validate or invalidate 
the description that they were trying to convincingly read.
In one stimulus condition, the neutral light of group three, 
external cues offered little if any information as to the 
veracity of the statement. On the other hand, subjects read­
ing low anxious statements in the presence of the truth light 
would, in looking for external cues, find a stimulus condition 
that contained information suggesting that the statements they 
were reading were true. In line with Bern's position, the sub­
jects would then tend to infer that the statements they were 
reading were self-descriptive. The significant differences 
found between groups one (low anxious statement, truth light) 
and three (low anxious, neutral light) support this line of 
reasoning. Moreover, the significant difference obtained
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between these two groups at the two-week follow-up suggest 
that the effect is relatively stable. Suggestive evidence 
for the stability of attributionally manipulated trait scores 
has previously been offered by Beaman, et al. (1972).
Also in accord with Bern's formulations, subjects reading 
high anxious statements in the presence of a stimulus that 
had been associated with untrue statements in the past (lie 
light) should tend to infer that the statements were not 
self-descriptive and subsequently decrease their scores on 
the Trait Inventory. The comparisons of groups two (high 
anxious statement, lie light) and four (high anxious state­
ment, neutral light) do not lend support for this hypothesis.
A possible reason for the failure to support this hypothesis 
could be that high anxious subjects who read high anxious 
statements were in fact reading statements that to some ex­
tent were self-descriptive. Therefore internal validating 
cues might be less ambiguous and subjects may be less likely 
to search for external sources to validate or invalidate the 
description. This speculation would be congruent with Bern's 
fundamental principles of self-perception theory.
Interestingly, the analysis of the State Inventory scores 
produced non-significant results. It appears that the results 
obtained on the Trait Inventory did not generalize to the 
subjects report of his present state of anxiety. In this re­
gard, the descriptions that the subjects read were by in large 
trait in content. That is, the statements were descriptive of
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global dispositions and appeared to have no measurable effect 
on the subjects' present state of anxiety. In accord with
I
this finding, Mischel (1973) has pointed to "man's impres­
sive discriminative facility (p. 258)" that has been regular­
ly found in studies of noncognitive personality dimensions. 
Thus it seems reasonable that subjects may have lowered their 
self-report scores on trait questions due to the trait state­
ments they read, but yet reported no change on state related 
questions.
Confounding the results of this study to some extent was 
the significant difference found between groups three and 
four at the testing following the experimental procedure.
These two groups differed on the statement that the subjects 
read. Group three read a low anxious personality description 
and group four a high anxious description. In both cases the 
stimulus coridition was that of a neutral light. On the basis 
of past research indicating that the reading of an attitudinal 
statement without further manipulation would not lead to atti­
tudinal change, it was predicted that these groups should not 
differ. Since differences were observed, it could be argued 
that dispositional statements substantially differ from atti­
tudinal ones. However, there is another more plausible ex­
planation besides assuming that the change resulted from the 
mere reading of the statement.
The change may have been mediated by an ascription of 
normality by the subjects to the descriptive statements.
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Subjects were told that the description they were reading was 
a collection of statements of previous subjects. Although it 
was not made explicit, subjects could have inferred that the 
composite statement was a description of a more-or-less 
"average" individual. In the high anxious conditions, sub­
jects inferring this "average" nature of the description could 
have re-evaluated their own self-descriptions and conclude 
that they were more "average" than they previously thought.
In other words, a subject reading a collection of "high an­
xious" statements that he assumes to be "average" and at the 
same time descriptive of himself to some extent, will subse­
quently, on self-report, mark statements in a less extreme 
way. Psychotherapists have assumed a similar process. Cli­
ents experiencing anxiety, depression, etc., often seem re­
assured knowing that their problems are not so unique and are 
found amongst "normal" and "average" people. It would follow 
then, from an informational processing standpoint, that a per­
son's self-perception is categorized, to some extent, in terms 
of how he differs from or is the same as others. A test-retest 
control group would have aided in the interpretation of these 
results.
To clarify this reasoning 24 new subjects were given 
the high anxious personality description to read. Half read 
the statement without the instructions used in the present 
study. Next each subject rated the degree to which the des­
cription appeared like an average person on a 7-point scale
anchored with "not average" (1) and "average" (7). The mean 
rating was 3.0 for this group. The other 12 subjects were 
told that they were to perform a part of an experiment that 
had previously been conducted. Briefly the rationale for the 
voice judgment study was described. Next the exact instruc­
tions used to introduce the high anxious statements in the 
present study were read followed by a request for the subjects 
to read the high anxious personality description. Finally 
these subjects were asked to rate the description on the 7- 
point scale. As predicted, the latter groups mean of 4.6 7 
indicated a greater ascription of normalacy (t = 2.61, df =
22, p < .01). Thus, this new information supported the specu­
lation above that an attributional process may have mediated 
the changes observed in high anxious statement conditions.
It could also be speculated that the same process was 
involved in groups one and three (both reading low anxious 
statements); that is, high anxious subjects reading low an­
xious statements could attribute normality to the descriptions 
and then assume that their anxiousness is even more extreme 
than they thought. This line of reasoning would not, of 
course, affect the comparisons of the two groups reading the 
same statement but it could be a variable for future investi­
gation. Moreover, an additive effect could be present in the 
comparison of the two control groups. Subjects reading low 
anxious statements could have "increased" their scores and 
subjects reading high anxious statements could have "decreased" 
their scores, making a significant difference between the two 
groups more likely.
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Mischel, in a recent book (196 8) and series of articles 
(1972, 1973) has addressed trait conceptions of personality.
In an exhaustive review of the empirical data relevant to 
trait conceptions, Mischel has concluded that there is little 
evidence for the existence of global dispositions that exert 
widely generalized effects on behavior. This finding is con­
trasted by the consistency often found when people rate their 
own traits on questionnaires or self-reports, even though 
these ratings have little to do with non-verbal behavior 
(Mischel, 1968, 1973). In other words, recall-based trait 
ratings often yield data that are consistent and systematic 
but not highly related to behavior based on direct observa­
tion. Moreover, traditional personality research has directed 
its attention towards the behavioral correlates of question­
naires and self-categorizations rather than the investigation 
of the way individuals come to categorize themselves, how such 
categorizations are maintained and how they change.
Mischel has postulated a set of person variables that are 
congruent with Bern's self-perception model and help elucidate 
the findings of the present study. Mischel maintains that 
consistency found on self-report trait’ ratings can be under­
stood from a cognitive-informational processing standpoint. 
Individuals develop personal constructs or styles of self­
presentation. These cognitive structures filter new informa­
tion that construct and maintain perceived consistency of self­
presentation. Such styles of presentation may be reflected in 
responses to personality tests such as the Trait Inventory 
used in this study.
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Prom both Mischel's viewpoint and that of Bern's, indivi­
duals self-perceptions are based upon informational input.
The subjects who read low anxious statements in the presence 
of the truth light were presented with new information that 
they had a lowered "trait anxiety" and subsequently lowered 
their self-report ratings of trait anxiety. The differences 
found between groups three and four (low anxious statement, 
neutral light and high anxious, neutral light) could be 
similarly understood. In the high anxious conditions sub­
jects could have been presented with information that high 
anxiety was more "average" than they previously thought. 
Considering this new information, they reported a less ex­
treme presentation of their "trait anxiety."
In that no behavioral measure of anxiety was taken, and 
in light of Mischel arguments, it does not seem appropriate to 
assume that the subjects actually reduced their anxiety as it 
would be behaviorally or physiologically defined, but, rather, 
that they re-evaluated their perception or presentation of the 
quantity of trait anxiety they possess.
As previously pointed out, traditional personality re­
search has directed its attention towards the behavioral cor­
relates of self-categorizations in the hope they would have 
utility in predicting behavior. In Mischel's view, self­
categorization is but one kind of person variable that could 
tell us much about how people construct self-perception but 
may have little utility in generalized behavioral predictions.
49
Future directions of research could examine this question 
by adding behavioral correlates to determine if the decrease 
in anxiety scores reflect only self-report changes of per­
sonality or are also reflective of non-verbal alterations.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
It has been postulated that a person comes to under­
stand himself in much the same way that a person learns of 
the attitudes, beliefs and dispositions of other people; 
that is, we learn of our own attitudes, beliefs and disposi­
tions, at least in part, from self-observation and from these 
observations we infer what we are like. This theory has been 
termed self-perception and has found support, both indirect 
and direct, from a number of experimental sources. However, 
most of the research has been directed at attitudes and 
beliefs with only one study directly concerned with person­
ality dispositions or traits. The present study was an 
attempt to extend self-perception theory to Trait Anxiety, 
a disposition that has been considered a relatively stable 
individual difference in anxiety proneness.
Using Bern's truth-lie light paradigm, it was hypothesized 
that high Trait anxious subjects, as measured by Spielberger's 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, who read a low-anxious state­
ment in a stimulus condition that in the past was associated 
with truthful statements (truth light) would subsequently 
decrease their scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory.
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Secondly, it was hypothesized that high Trait anxious subjects 
who read a high anxious statement in the presence of a stimu­
lus condition that in the past was associated with incorrect 
statements (lie light) would subsequently decrease their 
scores on the Trait Anxiety Inventory. Finally, it was hy­
pothesized that in both of the above conditions subjects 
would also decrease their State Anxiety Inventory scores.
The prediction that high anxious subjects would read 
a low anxious statement in the presence of the truth light 
would subsequently decrease their Trait Anxiety scores was 
confirmed in a comparison between this condition and a con­
trol group. It was also found that this change was maintained 
over at least a two-week period.
The hypothesis that high anxious subjects who read a 
high anxious statement in the presence of a lie light would 
subsequently decrease their Trait Anxiety scores did not 
receive support. The prediction that State Anxiety scores 
would also decrease as a function of reading a low anxious 
statement in the presence of the truth light or reading a high 
anxious statement in the presence of the lie light was not 
confirmed.
Confounding the results was a significant difference ob­
tained between two control groups that were not predicted to 
significantly differ. A rationale, formulated within self­
perception theory, was presented to explain this obtained 
difference and a post-hoc study was conducted to test this 
rationale. The post-hoc prediction was confirmed lending
52
some support to the proposed rationale. However, future 
research was suggested to elucidate this observed differ­
ence .
The results were discussed in terms of self-perception 
theory and recent discussions and research approaches of 
person variables posited by Mischel. Also, implications 
for clinical practice were discussed and future research 
directions were suggested.
APPENDIX A
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PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM
1. What is your first name?
2. What is your age? ■ _____________________________
3. When is your birthday? ____________________________
4. What is your mother's first name? ________ ______
5. What is your father's first name? ____________>
6. What is your school address? _____________________
7. Do you wear glasses? ______________________________
8. Do you wear hats? _______________________________ _
9. What is your major field of study? ______________
10. Are you generally favorable to sororities and
fraternities? ______________________________________
11. What is your grade-point average? _______________
12. In what city do your parents live? ______________
13. What is your best academic subject? _____________
14. Do you play bridge? ________________________ ______
15. What is the name of the last movie you have seen?
16. Do you favor abolishing grades? _________________
/
17. What is your favorite magazine? _______ __________
18. What is your height? ____________________________ _
19. What is the color of your eyes?  _______________
20. What is the color of your hair? _____________ ■
21. Can you drive a car? ______________________________
22. What political party do you faVor? ______________
23. Have you taken any courses in calculus? _________
24. Do you consider yourself even-tempered? _________
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25. Do you play chess? _______ __________________________
26. What is your favorite work of fiction? ____________
27. Have you been to Canada? ,. . _____________________
28. Have you been to Mexico? ___________________ ________
29. What is your favorite type of music? ■ ___________
30. Did you watch television last night? ______________
31. Have you even flown in a jet?  ____________________
32. Do you play a musical instrument?  _______________
33. What graduating class are you in? _________ ________
34. Are you wearing a ring? ,_________________________
35. How many psychology courses have you taken?
36. What high school did you attend? ___________________
37. Are you married or engaged? . ___________________
38. What foreign languages do you know? _______________
39. What is your favorite sport? _______________________
40. Are you right- or left-handed? _____________________
41. Whom would you like to see as the next President of
the United States?
42. Do you learn more from lectures or discussion
Sections? _____ ;_______________________________________
43. What brand of toothpaste do you use? ________ ______
44. What is the most important military service? _____
45. What was the main course at dinner last night?  _
46. Do you prefer hot or cold weather? ________________
47. Who is your favorite actress? ______________________
48. Who is your favorite actor? ________________________
49. Are you an extrovert or an introvert?_________ ______
50. What is man's most heinous crime?
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LOW ANXIOUS STATEMENT
My name is (first name) and I am a (Fresh., Soph., Jun., 
Sen.) at the University of Montana. I would describe myself 
as a calm person and am happy most of the time. I approach 
difficult situations in a straight-forward way and most of the 
time feel successful. I feel I have a great deal of unused 
capacity that I have not turned to my advantage, but I work 
hard at trying to usefully direct it. I don't tend to worry 
and fret over a lot of small things and although I have a few 
personality weaknesses, I am generally able to compensate for 
them. I don't often feel uneasy nor do I have a lot of diffi­
culty in making decisions.
I think I am generally a pretty self-confident person and 
although I have some problems I am generally able to overcome 
them. I prefer a Certain amount of change and variety. Al­
though once in a while I am a little restless, I am generally 
able to direct my energies towards the job or task that needs 
to be done. I seldom become so restless that I have trouble 
sleeping.
I feel confident about most activities I engage in and 
when my performance is not as good as I would like it to be I 
don't tend to worry a lot about it but usually decide to 
improve next time. Although, like everyone else, I have some 
problems and disappointments, I feel my life is generally a 
happy and pleasant one.
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HIGH ANXIOUS STATEMENT
My name is (first name) and I am a (Fresh., Soph., Jun., 
Sen.) at the University of Montana. I would describe myself 
as a nervous person and I am not always as happy as I want to 
be. Difficult situations tend to upset me and I often feel 
insecure and worry about the outcome. I feel I have a great 
deal of unused capacity, but don't seem to have the energy to 
usefully direct it to my advantage. I seem to worry and fret 
over a lot of small things and this tends to make me very up­
set. When I am called upon to make a decision I become uneasy 
and have difficulty in making up my mind.
I am not as self-confident as other people are and I find 
the difficulty parts of my life often hard to overcome. I 
prefer a certain amount of change and variety. Often I am 
restless and find it difficult to direct my energies towards 
the job or task that needs to be done. Sometimes I become so 
restless that I have trouble sleeping.
I don’t feel as confident as I would like when I engage 
in activities and when my performance is not as good as I would 
like it to be, I tend to worry a lot about it, even though I 
know worrying doesn't help. Comparing myself to what I think 
other people are like, I don't think my life is as happy and 
pleasant as it could be.
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